Abstract-Femtocells can effectively resolve the poor connectivity issue of indoor cellular users. This paper investigates the economic incentive for a cellular operator to add femtocell service on top of its existing macrocell service. We model the interactions between a cellular operator and users as a Stackelberg game: The operator first determines spectrum allocations and pricings of femtocell and macrocell services, and then heterogeneous users choose between the two services and the amount of resource to request. In the ideal case where the femtocell service has the same full spatial coverage as the macrocell service, we show that the operator will choose to provide femtocell service only, as this leads to a better user quality of service and a higher operator profit. However, if we impose the constraint that no users' payoffs decrease after introducing the femtocell service, then the operator will always continue providing the macrocell service (with or without the femtocell service). Furthermore, we study the impact of operational cost, limited coverage, and spatial reuse on femtocell service provision. As the operational cost increases, fewer users are served by femtocell service and the operator's profit decreases. When the femtocell service has limited spatial coverage, the operator always provides the macrocell service beside the femtocell service. However, when the coverage is high or the total resource is low, the operator will set the prices such that all users who can access femtocell will choose to use the femtocell service only. Finally, spatial reuse of spectrum will increase the efficiency of femtocell services and gives the operator more incentives to allocate spectrum to femtocells.
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INTRODUCTION
T HE next-generation 4G cellular systems aim at providing end users with high data rates and reliable services by operating at wider and higher frequency bands (e.g., 2,496-to-2,690 MHz for TD-LTE in US). However, severe signal attenuation at these high frequencies often causes poor signal receptions for indoor users, who are separated by walls from outdoor cellular base stations of macrocells. 1 To solve the poor signal reception problem for indoor users, researchers have proposed the idea of femtocell (e.g., [7] , [8] , [9] ). Compared to macrocells, femtocells are short-range, low deployment cost, and low power userdeployed tiny base stations. A user can deploy a femtocell at home and connect it to the wireline broadband Internet connection, for example, the digital subscriber line (DSL). Femtocells are often managed by the same operator that controls the macrocells, and they can provide better quality of service (QoS) to indoor users as they are very close to users' cell phones. Currently, the operator can provide the femtocell service via one of the two modes: closed access or open access [8] , [17] . In both modes, femtocell users need to purchase the femtocells from the operator and deploy the devices at their homes. In the closed access mode, a user needs to register with a femtocell before enjoying the femtocell service (when the user is close to the femtocell). The femtocell will never serve unregistered users. In the open access mode, however, a femtocell serves all users close by without require prior registration. Most femtocell owners prefer closed access mode [17] , [18] , as this helps to preserve limited network capacity and reduce privacy loss. We will focus on the closed access mode in this paper.
Despite the obvious motivation to deploy femtocell service, the operator needs to carefully consider several issues that will affect the economic return of the femtocell service.
First, the femtocell service needs to share the limited licensed bands with the macocell service. There are two types of sharing schemes. The first scheme is "separate carriers," where the femtocells and macrocells occupy nonoverlapping spectrum bands (e.g., [10] , [16] , [19] ). The second scheme is "shared carriers" (or "partially shared carriers"), where macrocells and femtocells operate on (partially) overlapping bands (e.g., [9] , [20] , [28] ). Each scheme has its certain advantages and disadvantages:
. "Separate carriers" scheme is easy to manage and can avoid interferences between macrocells and femtocells. For example, China Unicom (one of the three main wireless service providers in mainland China and the first one deploying femtocell since 2009) is in strong favor of this scheme [37] . This scheme can support two types of access schemes: the public access where femtocell network becomes an extension of the macrocell network and can be used by any user of the operator, and the private access scheme where only registered femtocell users can gain access [10] . However, a "separate carriers" scheme reduces the available spectrum for both services.
. "Shared carriers" (or "partially shared carriers") scheme is an efficient frequency allocation scheme where macrocells and femtocells operate on (partially) the same spectrum (i.e., co-channel operation). In this case, the operation of femtocells leads to increased interferences for macrocell users and affects macrocell capacity and service quality [10] , [19] . Proper interference management is very challenging, as femtocells are deployed by users, and thus, the interference is often hard to predict by the operator. Also, a key requirement for co-channel operation is to allow public access on all femtocells (and thus may not support private access) [10] . The purpose of this requirement is to mitigate femtocells' interferences to macrocell users by forcing macrocell users to switch to femtocell service whenever possible. However, such public access leads to significant signaling overhead due to increased handovers [15] . In this paper, we will focus on the first "separate carriers" scheme.
Second, when an operator introduces the femtocell service and charges a higher price, some users who originally experience good macrocell service quality may experience a decrease in payoff with the femtocell service due to a higher femtocell payment. It is important to ensure the satisfaction of these users by keeping the original macrocell service available at the original price. This will limit the resource allocation to femtocell service.
Third, although femtocells are low in deployment costs, the femtocell service may incur additional operational cost compared to macrocells. Femtocell users' traffics need to go through wireline broadband Internet connections. The wireline internet service providers (ISPs) may impose additional charges on the femtocell related traffics [21] . Also, since the femtocell users' traffics will go through the ISP's network before reaching the cellular operator's own network, issues such as synchronization with macrocells become more challenging to resolve [22] , [23] . Moreover, femtocell service needs billing system integration with macrocell service and requires additional customer support.
In this paper, we will discuss the economic incentive of the operator's femtocell service provision, by considering three issues discussed above. We want to understand when and how the operator should offer the femtocell service, and the corresponding impacts on the original macrocell service. Our main results and contributions include
. A dynamic decision model: We model and analyze the interactions between a cellular operator and users as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Users experience different channel conditions and spectrum efficiencies with the macrocell service, but all of them achieve a high spectrum efficiency with the femtocell service. Thus, users have different preferences between macrocells and femtocells. The operator makes spectrum allocations and pricing decisions for both macrocell and femtocell services to maximize its total profit. . Profit-maximizing with femtocell service only: If femtocell service has the same maximum coverage as macrocell service, then a profit-maximizing operator will choose to only offer femtocell service to all its users. . Dual service provision considering users' reservation payoffs: If we consider users' reservation payoffs as what they can achieve with the original macrocell service, then offering femtocell service only may force some users to leave and thus may not be optimal to the operator. In this case, we characterize when and how the operator should provide the femtocell service together with the macrocell service (i.e., dual services) so that all users achieve payoffs no worse than their reservation payoffs. . Impact of femtocell spatial reuse, operational cost, and limited coverage: When multiple femtocells can reuse the same spectrum resource, the operator has more incentives to allocate spectrum to femtocell, and the femtocell price will be reduced to reflect this "small cell" advantage. Moreover, when femtocell service incurs operational cost to the operator or has a smaller coverage than the macrocell service, the operator will always serve users by dual services. Furthermore, as cost decreases or coverage increases, more users are served by the femtocell service. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We introduce the network model of macrocell service in Section 2, which serves as a benchmark for later analysis. In Section 3, we introduce the network model of femtocell service and analyze how the operator provides dual services in terms of spectrum allocations and pricing. Then, we extend the results in Section 3 to Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7, by examining the impacts of users' reservation payoffs, femtocell frequency reuse, femtocell operational costs, and limited femtocell coverage. We conclude our work in Section 8.
Related Work
Most prior work on femtocells focused on various technical issues in service provision (e.g., access control and resource management [20] , [24] , [25] , [26] , [27] , [40] ). Chandrasekhar and Andrews [20] analyzed the uplink capacity and proposed an interference avoidance strategy for the coexistence of femtocells and macrocells in a CDMA network. Benmesbah et al. [24] proposed a decentralized spectral resource allocation for OFMDA downlink of coexisting macro and femto network. Rangan [25] proposed to control femto-macro interference by interference cancelation and subband scheduling. Shi et al. [27] proposed an analytical model to explicitly investigate the uplink capacity and coverage of femtocells that coexist within macrocells. Tan [26] studied the power control problem in Rayleigh-fading heterogeneous networks.
Only few papers have studied the economic issues of femtocell service [16] , [17] , [29] , [30] , [31] . Claussen et al. [29] explored the financial impact of femtocells on a macrocell network, with a focus on the network deployment costs. Lin et al. [17] compared three deployment types of femtocells, i.e., joint deployment, operator deployment, and user deployment frameworks. Yun et al. [30] studied whether it is economically beneficial for the cellular operator or femtocell owners to provide femtocell service to guest users. Chen et al. [31] further studied how to motivate femtocell owners to open their resource to guest macrocell users. Shetty et al. [16] analyzed the interplay of interferences and service pricing on users' adoption of femtocells. The key difference between our paper and the existing literature is that we study the operator's provision of dual services in terms of both spectrum allocations and pricing decisions. We also characterize the impacts of users' reservation payoffs, the femtocell operational cost, and the limited femtocell coverage on the service provision.
Our model on dual services is related to the dual-channel model in supply chain management, where a seller adds a direct channel (e.g., online selling) to the existing retailing channel to sell the same products [32] , [33] . There was no constraint on the operator's availability in obtaining resource. In our model, however, the operator's spectrum is limited, and the dual services (i.e., femtocell and macrocell services) are different in both QoS and coverage, which lead to an interesting new formulation and different engineering insights.
BENCHMARK: MACROCELL SERVICE ONLY
As a benchmark, we first look at how the operator prices the macrocell service to maximize its profit without the choice of the femtocell service. When we consider the introduction of femtocell service in Sections 3, 4, 6, and 7, the operator should achieve a profit no worse than this benchmark. Also, what users get in this benchmark will serve as their reservation payoffs in Section 4.
We consider an operator who owns a single macrocell. 2 It owns a total B Hz wireless spectrum bandwidth to provide macrocell service, where each macrocell user is allocated part of the bandwidth and transmits over the allocated part accordingly. As shown in Fig. 1 , we model the interactions between the operator and the users as a two-stage Stackelberg game. In Stage I, the operator determines the macrocell price p M (per unit bandwidth) to maximize its profit. Here, subscript M denotes macrocells. In Stage II, each user decides how much bandwidth to purchase to maximize its payoff. This usage-based pricing scheme is widely used in today's cellular macrocell networks, especially in Europe and Asia [34] , [36] . In US, AT&T (since December 2009) and Verizon (since July 2011) have adopted the usage-based pricing for wireless data services. Usage-based pricing for femtocell has just started. For example, AT&T's femtocell service counts the femtocell data usage as part of the regular cellular usage (together with the macrocell data usage), which is subject to usage-based pricing [38] . Due to the exponential growth of wireless data traffic and the scarce spectrum resource, we envision that usage-based pricing for both macrocell and femtocell services will become more common in the near future.
We next solve this two-stage Stackelberg game by backward induction.
Users' Bandwidth Demands in Stage II
Different users experience different channel conditions to the macrocell base stations due to different locations and thus achieve different data rates when using the same amount of bandwidth. We consider that a user has fixed transmission power P per unit bandwidth (e.g., power spectrum density constraint) and his average channel gain in the macrocell is h. Without interfering with other users, the user's macrocell spectrum efficiency is thus
where n 0 is the background noise power density. By obtaining b Hz of spectrum, its achieved data rate is b bits per second. As users have different channel gains in macrocell service, they perceive different macrocell spectrum efficiency . A larger means a better channel condition and a higher spectrum efficiency when using the macrocell service. In Section 3, we will show that all users achieve the same high spectrum efficiency with femtocell service as the femtocell is always close an indoor user. Note that can be normalized in the range ½0; 1 and here we assume the is uniformly distributed (see Fig. 2 ). 3 We also normalize the total user population to be 1 as in [11] .
For a user with a macrocell spectrum efficiency , it obtains a utility uð; bÞ when achieving data rate b [3] , i.e., uð; bÞ ¼ lnð1 þ bÞ:
Such utility is commonly used in economic literature to denote the diminishing return of getting additional resource [39] . The user needs to pay a linear payment p M b to the operator, where the price p M is announced by the operator in Stage I. The user's payoff is the difference between its utility and payment, i.e.,
The optimal value of bandwidth demand that maximizes the user's payoff with the macrocell service is 2. The results of this paper can be extended to a multiple macrocell scenario, where frequency reuse is allowed over macrocells.
which is decreasing in p M and increasing in (if p M ). The user's maximum payoff with macrocell service is
0; otherwise;
which is always nonnegative and is increasing in .
Operator's Pricing in Stage I
Next, we consider the operator's optimal choice of price p M in Stage I. To achieve a positive profit, the operator needs to set p M max 2½0;1 ¼ 1, so that at least some user purchases some positive bandwidth in Stage II. The fraction of users choosing macrocell service is 1 À p M as shown in Fig. 2 . The total user demand is
which is a decreasing function of p M . On the other hand, the operator has a limited bandwidth supply B and thus can only satisfy the demand no larger than B.
The operator chooses price p M to maximize its profit, i.e.,
Notice that the first term in the min operation of (5) is increasing in p M , while the second term is decreasing in p M since dp M Q M ðp M Þ dp M ¼ ln p M < 1:
By also checking the two terms' values at the p M boundary values, we can conclude that the optimal solution to Problem (5) is unique and the two terms are equal at the optimality. 
To facilitate later discussions, we denote this p Notice that all users with a macrocell spectrum efficiency less than p bench M will not receive macrocell service. When the total bandwidth B is small, the equilibrium macrocell price p bench M is close to 1, and thus, most users will not get service. This motivates the operator to adopt the femtocell service so that it can serve these users and generate additional profits.
PROVISION OF FEMTOCELL SERVICE
We now consider how femtocell service can improve the operator's profit. Note that the some users preferring one service (e.g., femtocell service) can be rejected if the bandwidth in that service is not enough. This is motivated by the fact that a femtocell with limited bandwidth can only serve several users [31] . Similarly, if a macrocell faces demands from too many users, some users will be out of service.
The analysis in this section is based on several assumptions, each of which will be relaxed in later sections:
. Each user has a zero reservation payoff. This means that if a user's bandwidth demand in macrocell service is not satisfied, he will switch to femtocell as long as its payoff is positive. 5 This assumption will be relaxed in Section 4. . Different femtocells use different spectrum bands and do not have frequency reuse. This assumption will be relaxed in Section 5. . The femtocell service does not incur any additional operational cost compared to the macrocell service. This assumption will be relaxed in Section 6. . The femtocell service has the same maximum coverage as the macrocell service, and each user can access to both macrocell and femtocell services. This assumption will be relaxed in Section 7. It should be noted that we also jointly relax all four assumptions in Appendix E, available in the online supplemental material, where most engineering insights in Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 still hold.
We are interested in answering the following two questions:
. Is it economically viable for the operator to introduce the femtocell service? . If so, how should the operator determine resource allocation and pricing for macrocell and femtocell services? Under the assumptions in this section, we will show that the operator will choose to only provide femtocell service (i.e., no macrocell service) and charge a femtocell price p Ã F than the optimal macrocell price p Ã M derived in the benchmark (Section 2).
Notice that we have assumed that the femtocell service has the same maximum coverage as the macrocell service in this section. This means that if a user decides to become a femtocell user, there is no need for him to use macrocell service at any time.
More specifically, we will look at a two-stage Stackelberg game as in Fig. 3 . In Stage I, the operator determines bandwidth allocated to femtocell service (femtocell band B F ) and to macrocell service (macrocell band B M ), with
The operator also determines the femtocell price p F and macrocell price p M . In Stage II, each user decides which service to choose and how much bandwidth to purchase. If a user's demand cannot be satisfied by its preferred service, it will purchase bandwidth from the other service. 6 We will again analyze this two-stage Stackelberg game by using backward induction. 4 . The superscript of p bench M means the benchmark scenario with marcrocell service only.
5. For example, users may have zero reservation payoff if the operator is the monopolist in the local market and users do not have other operator choices. This is the case in countries such as Mexico and some other Latin American, where America Movil is the dominant operator.
6. Note that a user chooses either femtocell or macrocell service in our closed access mode.
Users' Service Choices and Bandwidth Demands in Stage II
If a user has a macrocell spectrum efficiency , its maximum payoff by using the macrocell service is given in (3). Next, we consider users' payoffs by using the femtocell service. Since femtocell base stations are deployed indoors and are very close to the users' cell phones, we assume that all users using the femtocell service have equal good channel conditions and all of them achieve the high spectrum efficiency. This means that independent of the macrocell spectrum efficiency , each user achieves the same payoff F ðbÞ when using a bandwidth of b to reach data rate b,
The user's optimal demand in femtocells is
user's maximum payoff with the femtocell service is
which is always nonnegative. It is clear that a user with a small macrocell spectrum efficiency can get a better payoff by using the femtocell service instead of the macrocell service. Thus, there exists a threshold of that separates the users of two services. Next, we define two different types of thresholds.
Definition 1 (Users' preferred partition threshold pr th pr th ). Users with 2 ½0; pr th Þ prefer to use the femtocell service, and users with 2 ½ pr th ; 1 prefer to use the macrocell service. Definition 2 (Users' partition threshold th th ). Users with 2 ½ th ; 1 actually receive the macrocell service finally, and users with 2 ½0; th Þ receive either the femtocell service or no service.
Notice that some users within the range of ½ th ; 1 may not prefer to be served by the macrocell service. The preferred partition threshold pr th only depends on the prices p M and p F . If all users' demands from their preferred services are satisfied by large enough B F and B M , then users' preferred partition threshold equals users' partition threshold (i.e., pr th ¼ th ). However, in general, th may be different from pr th , depending on the operator's choice of B F and B M in the first stage. We assume that the operator has a higher priority to serve users with larger values of by macrocell service (as it is more efficient for the macrocell service to do so). Thus, it is possible for the operator to reject a user's choice of macrocell service if its value is low.
By comparing a user's optimal payoff with macrocell and femtocell services in (3) and (9), we have the following result.
Lemma 1 (Users' preferred partition threshold
Users with a small macrocell spectrum efficiency < p M =p F prefer the femtocell service, and users with a large macrocell spectrum efficiency > p M =p F prefer the macrocell service. Now, we introduce the concept of finalized demand.
Definition 3 (User's finalized demand). If a user's demand
from its preferred service is satisfied, then its finalized demand is its preferred demand. If a user's demand from its preferred service is not satisfied, then the user may switch to the alternative service and the new demand becomes the finalized demand. Lemma 2. At the equilibrium, the operator's total bandwidth B equals users' total finalized demand.
Proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix A, available in the online supplemental material.
Based on Lemma 2, we can further show that bandwidth allocated to each service equals users' total finalized demand in that service. That is, 7. Note that this user's finalized demand may or may not be satisfied, depending on whether the alternative service has enough resource. 
By examining (12), we have the following result.
Theorem 2. At the equilibrium, the operator will only provide femtocell service, i.e., B 
and the operator's equilibrium profit is
Proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix B, available in the online supplemental material.
Theorem 2 is intuitive to understand. As the femtocell service provides a higher QoS to all users, 8 the operator can attract the users with small macrocell spectrum efficiency , and sell out the whole bandwidth B at a price p Ã F ¼ 1=ð1 þ BÞ higher than the equilibrium macrocell price p bench M in Theorem 1. This means the operator obtains a higher profit by only providing femtocell service.
However, a user who has a large (e.g., ! 1) will achieve a smaller payoff Þ as a user's reservation payoff below which the user will not accept the femtocell service, 9 then the operator can no longer only provide femtocell service. Next section studies this case in detail.
IMPACT OF USERS' RESERVATION PAYOFFS
In this section, we will consider the operator's decisions by assuming that each user with a macrocell spectrum efficiency receives a payoff no less than M ð; b Ã ; p bench M Þ as calculated in (3) . This means that the operator always needs to provide macrocell service at the same price as p bench M derived based on (6) . Also, all users' preferred demands in macrocell service should be satisfied. Next, we consider a two-stage decision process similar to Fig. 3 . The only difference here is that the operator needs to satisfy users' reservation payoffs.
In this section only, we assume that the operator has a priority to serve the users with the smallest first in femtocell service. This is reasonable since femtocell service aims at improving QoS of indoor users especially for those with a small macrocell spectrum efficiency. These users cannot use macrocell service and will be happy to pay a high price for the femtocell service. For users with a high macrocell spectrum efficiency, they have the additional choice of macrocell service and will not use femtocell service if p F is high.
We will again use backward induction to analyze the problem. As Stage II is the same as Section 3.1, we will focus on the operator's decisions on B M , B F , and p F in Stage I. 
This implies that when supply B is low, the operator needs to allocate all its bandwidth supply B for macrocell service to reach users' reservation payoffs. Only when B is high, the operator can serve all users by dual services (i.e., macrocell and femtocell services). This will be further illustrated in Figs. 5 and 7. Notice that as long as supply B is high, femtocell band needs to serve users more than those with 2 ½0; p 8. The only exception will be users with ¼ 1, who have a zero size support under the uniform distribution assumption of .
9. For example, the user may switch to a different operator who provides macrocell service.
By following a similar analysis as in Section 3, we can show that the total supply B equals users' total finalized demand at the equilibrium (i.e., Lemma 2). The operator's profit-maximization problem can be simplified as 
where p bench M is computed from (6) , and the right inequality of the first constraint means that the operator cannot violate users' preferences in macrocell service. In the second constraint, the first and second terms on the left-hand side are the users' finalized total demands in femtocells and macrocells, respectively.
Problem (15) is difficult to solve in closed form, so we use numerical results to illustrate some interesting insights. , where the femtocell price is lower and becomes attractive to users. We can observe sharp decrease of p Ã F at the boundary value B ¼ 3:5 that distinguishes the low and high supply regimes. This is consistent with Lemma 3 where the operator needs to serve users more than those with 2 ½0; p bench M once in the high supply regime, and thus, the femtocell price needs to be significantly reduced to attract users. We further observe that p Ã F decreases faster than p bench M in the high supply regime, which means that the operator wants to attract more users to the more efficient femtocell service. Fig. 6 shows the users' equilibrium partition threshold Ã th with dual services, comparing to the partition threshold of the macrocell service only case in Section 2. In the low supply regime (i.e., B < 3:5), two curves overlap as the dual services degenerate to the macrocell service only in this regime. However, in the high supply regime, the operator will announce similar femtocell and macrocell prices (see Fig. 5 ), and most users will choose to use femtocell service (see Fig. 6 ). Unlike the femtocell service only case in Section 3 (without considering users' reservation payoffs), here users with large values will choose to stay with the macrocell service and are not affected by the introduction of femtocell service. will continue to increase as more resource needs to distribute to high theta users. Fig. 8 compares the operator's profits in three different cases: femtocell service only as in Section 3, dual services as in this section, and macrocell service only as in Section 2. In the low supply regime, dual services degenerate to the macrocell service case. In the high supply regime, the profit of the dual services becomes closer to the femtocell service only case as B increases. This means that considering users' reservation payoffs will not lead to significant profit loss when the total resource is abundant. In this case, only users with a very close to 1 will stay with the macrocell service and all other users will choose the femtocell service.
IMPACT OF FEMTOCELL FREQUENCY REUSE
In Section 3, we have assumed that different femtocells use different spectrum bands. However, as a femtocell often has a smaller coverage (e.g., tens of meters within a home) than the macrocell (e.g., hundreds of meters), it is often possible to have multiple nonoverlapping femtocells within the same macrocell coverage. These nonoverlapping femtocells can use the same spectrum band without interfering with each other. This is also called frequency reuse. We will discuss how frequency reuse affects the operator's provision of femtocell service.
Our analysis here will be based on the simplified scenario as in Section 3. We again analyze the two-stage game by using backward induction. Here, the users' requests in service and bandwidth in Stage II are the same as Section 3.1. If the same spectrum is allocated to two different femtocells, then the operator collect twice of the revenue. Now, we are ready to analyze Stage I to derive the operator's equilibrium decisions. Let us denote the average number of interfering femtocells that cannot use the same frequency spectrum as K, and the frequency reuse factor is then 1=K. We will assume that the total number of femtocells is N > K. Thus, after considering frequency reuse, the available spectrum to each femtocell increases from B F =N to B F =K. Then, the total available bandwidth to all femtocells will be B F N=K instead of B F .
By following a similar proof as that of Theorem 2, we have the following result. 
which is increasing in the ratio N K .
By comparing (17) to (14), we conclude that the operator obtains a larger profit by adopting frequency reuse for femtocells. This is consistent with the current engineering practice of reducing cell size to increase frequency reuse and improve network capacity. Apparently, smaller femtocell size means a larger N, and thus a larger capacity increasing ratio N=K and a larger profit.
IMPACT OF FEMTOCELL OPERATIONAL COST
In Section 3, we have assumed that there is no additional operational cost of the femtocell service. The data from the femtocells will be delivered through the wireline Internet connection of an ISP back to the operator's cellular network, free of charge. However, this is only reasonable when the operator and the ISP belong to the same entity or the ISP is sharing friendly as in [5] , [6] . In this section, we consider the case where the ISP will charge the operator usage-based fees for using the wireline Internet connection in downloading femtocell users' traffics from Internet. We are interested in understanding how this additional operational cost affects the provision of femtocell service.
For simplicity, we assume that the operational cost is linearly proportional to femtocell bandwidth with the coefficient C. This assumption is reasonable if the ISP adopts the usage-based charging that is linear in femtocell users' total traffic volume. 10 Recall that in Section 3, we have shown each femtocell user's data rate and traffic volume are linear in its bandwidth demand; thus, all femtocell users' total traffic volume is also linear in their total bandwidth demand. We focus on the case of C 2 ð0; 1Þ. It is easy to show that if C ! 1, then the operator will charge a femtocell price p F > 1, and no user will choose the femtocell service based on (8) . In other words, an operational cost C ! 1 means no femtocell service.
We consider a two-stage decision process similar as in Fig. 3 . The analysis of Stage II is the same as in Section 3.1.
Here, we will focus on the operator's decisions on B M , B F , p M , and p F in Stage I. Following a similar analysis as in Section 3, we can show that the total bandwidth B equals users' total finalized demand at the equilibrium (i.e., Lemma 2). Then, we can formulate the operator's profitmaximization problem as 
subject to p M th 1;
Then, we have the following result.
Theorem 4. With a femtocell operational cost C 2 ð0; 1Þ, the operator always provides both femtocell service and macrocell service at the equilibrium, and p
The proof of Theorem 4 is given in Appendix D, available in the online supplemental material. Note that p Ã M is the equilibrium macrocell price, and Ã th is the users' equilibrium partition threshold with dual services. Intuitively, a positive operational cost C forces the operator to charge a higher femtocell price p Ã F than the value in (13) . However, the small payment from users with a large value of (who only experience a little QoS improvement) in the femtocell service cannot cover the increased operational cost to the operator. As a result, the operator will serve these users by the macrocell service.
Problem (18) is difficult to solve in closed form, so we use numerical results to illustrate some interesting insights. Fig. 9 shows the operator's equilibrium femtocell price p as a function of B and C. The threshold Ã th decreases in both B and C, which means that more users will choose to use the macrocell service due to the increase of p Fig. 11 shows the operator's equilibrium bandwidth allocations to dual services as functions of B and C. When B is small, femtocell band B Ã F increases with B since the operator wants to serve more users at much higher femtocell price. When B is large, B Ã F decreases with B and a larger C value causes B Ã F to decrease earlier (e.g., the decrease starts from B ¼ 1:6, 1.1, and 0.6 when C ¼ 0:1, 0.2, and 0.5, respectively). Intuitively, the operator wants to maximize the profit by clearing the market (i.e., total supply equals total demand); thus, both femtocell and macrocell prices should be low to match with the high supply B. However, the cost C serves as the lower bound of femtocell price, and the high femtocell price (relative to macrocell price) makes more users switch to macrocell service as B increases. A higher value of C will further exaggerate this switching. Fig. 12 shows that the operator's equilibrium profit increases in B and decreases in C.
IMPACT OF LIMITED FEMTOCELL COVERAGE
In Section 3, we have assumed that femtocell service has the same maximum coverage as the macrocell service. In this section, we relax this assumption and consider that femtocell service only covers a small percentage of the macrocell coverage area as illustrated in Fig. 13 . 11 We will try to understand how the limited coverage affects the provision of femtocell service. We still consider a two-stage decision process similar to Fig. 3 .
We assume that the femtocell service covers 2 ð0; 1Þ portion of the macrocell coverage area. If users are uniformly distributed in space, then only portion of all users can 11. For simplicity, we assume that multiple femtocells cannot reuse the same frequency bands. potentially access both services (called overlapping users). The rest 1 À portion of users can only access the macrocell service (called nonoverlapping users).
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Our results in Section 3 show that the operator wants to serve all overlapping users by the more efficient femtocell service if possible. The operator can try to achieve this via two approaches. The first approach is to announce the same price for both macrocell and femtocell services, which makes the macrocell service less attractive than the femtocell service to all overlapping users. This approach, however, means that the macrocell price is too high and may not be most profitable when is small. The second approach is to allocate all bandwidth B to the femtocell service. However, this may not be most profitable either, since the nonoverlapping users will be out of service.
Recall that the operator serves macrocell users with good signals (i.e., a larger ) first; thus, some users with a small will not be able to receive the macrocell service (even if they prefer so) if the macrocell band is not enough. Let us denote non th as the minimum spectrum efficiency among all nonoverlapping users served by macrocell service. If a nonoverlapping user with is served by macrocell service, another overlapping user with the same should also be able to request and obtain macrocell service successfully. This is because the operator cannot distinguish whether a user is in the femtocell coverage or not. Moreover, the operator wants to serve as many overlapping users as possible by the more efficient femtocell service. Thus, we conclude that the partition threshold of overlapping users is th ¼ maxð non th ; p M =p F Þ. The total finalized demand of the macrocell service is
We can show that the operator will allocate B M ¼ Q M ðp M ; p F ; non th Þ for the macrocell service and will allocate the remaining bandwidth B F ¼ B À Q M ðp M ; p F ; non th Þ to the femtocell service to serve overlapping users with 2 ½0; th . Following a similar analysis as in Section 3, we can show that the total bandwidth B equals users' total finalized demand at the equilibrium. That is,
Theorem 5. At the equilibrium, the operator will satisfy all users' preferred demands by their preferred services. Nonoverlapping and overlapping users' service partition thresholds are 
If we write p M as a function of non th , i.e., p M ð non th Þ, then by using the implicit function theorem we have dp M ð non th Þ d non th
which shows that p M ð non th Þ is decreasing in non th . Next, we prove that the operator's profit is increasing in p M . As p M increases to p M þ , where is positive and infinitesimal such that p M þ < p F , then non th will decrease a little bit. In this case, more nonoverlapping users are served by the macrocell service at a higher price. Among overlapping users, the service partition threshold th increases to
, and all users' preferred demands are satisfied. Thus, femtocell band increases from B F to B F þ and macrocell band decreases to B À B F À , where is positive and is a function of . The operator's profit changes from
and the profit difference is thus
Hence, the operator has the incentive to increase p M , and p M < . In that case, p M increases to a new value of p þ M . We want to show the operator's profit will increase. In this case, users' total finalized demand still equals total bandwidth B, and the finalized demands from overlapping users with 2 ½0; non th À remains unchanged. Then, the operator's remaining bandwidths to serve other users before and after changing p M are the same (as we have assumed that p F remains fixed), i.e., 12 . We may also consider mobile users, in which case some user may subscribe to both services. More specifically, when a user is in an area only covered by the macrocell service, he will use to the macrocell service (or not using the service if his is too small). However, when the same user moves into the area that is covered by both the macrocell and femtocell services, he may switch to the femtocell service (depending on his value of ). We believe that the main insights in this section will still hold with mobile users, although the thresholds in Theorem 5 will change.
Problem (28) is difficult to solve in closed form, so we use numerical results to illustrate some interesting insights. The operator will announce the same price for both services, i.e., p
This means that all overlapping users will be served by the femtocell service. Intuitively, small B implies limited total resource, and thus, it is more important to serve all overlapping users with the more efficient femtocell service than to serve more nonoverlapping users with the macrocell service. . This means that the overlapping users will be served by both femtocell and macrocell services. As the total resource is abundant in this case, it becomes important to provide enough resource for the macrocell service and get enough revenue from the nonoverlapping users as well. As the operator cannot differentiate users based on their coverage areas, some nonoverlapping users will also get served by the macrocell service. We notice that the threshold between two regimes increases with , i.e., from B ¼ 0:1 when ¼ 0:2 to B ¼ 3:1 when ¼ 0:8. As a larger means more overlapping users, it becomes more attractive to provide the more efficient femtocell service to all overlapping users by setting p Fig. 15 shows the operator's bandwidth allocations to two services as functions of B and . As femtocell coverage increases, the operator will serve more users in femtocells and will allocate more bandwidth to femtocells. Fig. 16 shows that the operator's equilibrium profit increases in both B and . The operator benefits from the availability to serve more users by the more efficient femtocell service.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This paper studies the economic incentive for a cellular operator to introduce the femtocell service on top of its existing macrocell service. We analyze the operator's equilibrium decisions in terms of spectrum allocations and pricing of dual services. Compared to the macrocell service, we show that the femtocell service can attract more users at a higher price and increase the operator's profit. However, the requirement of satisfying users' reservation payoffs (i.e., what they can achieve without the femtocell service) prevents the operator from only providing femtocell service. We also study the impacts of femtocell frequency reuse, operational cost, and limited coverage on femtocell service provision, where the operator's profit increases with frequency reuse, decreases in operational cost, and increases in femtocell coverage.
There are several directions to extend the results in this paper. We can further consider the "shared carriers" scheme, where femtocell service and macrocell service share part of or the whole spectrum. We need to optimize the pricing and spectrum allocation decisions by trading off the increased spectrum availabilities and mutual interferences. The results here also lay the foundation of further study of market competition between multiple operators, where some or all of them provide the femtocell service on top of their existing macrocell service. Moreover, we can further study a distributed femteocell system, where the femtocell is operated by an independent operator other than the macrocell operator. Some preliminary studies along this line can be found in our another paper submission [41] . Biying Shou received the BE degree from Tsinghua University and the MS and PhD degrees from Northwestern University. She is an assistant professor of management sciences at the City University of Hong Kong. Her main research interests include operations and supply chain management, marketing/operations interface, and economics of wireless networks. She has published in leading journals including Operations Research, Production and Operations Management, Naval Research Logistics, and the IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications.
